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The respected Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC) Group 
has consistently assessed Singapore's domestic political risk as low. 
Since 1997, on a scale of between zero and 10, with zero being the 
best grade possible and 10 the worst, the city-state's worst grade for 
domestic political risk was below 3 (PERC 2005). Singapore's scores 
hover mostly around the 2 mark. PERC partly attributes Singapore's 
low domestic political risk to the fact that it is 'very difﬁcult for a formal 
political opposition to unseat the PAP (People's Action Party) from 
power even if there were a vibrant multi-party system' (PERC 2005). 
This observation is shared by Freedom House, an international 
NGO that publishes an annual report on global trends in democracy: 
'Citizens of Singapore cannot change their government democrati-
cally' (Freedom House 2005). Political risk is often associated with the 
threat of potential changes of government that may result in changes 
in policies that may adversely affect the country's business climate. 
Political risk is a concern to all countries. Unlike many other countries 
that boast of their mature and institutionalized democracies that 
allow for the smooth change of governments without jeopardizing 
the business climate, the case of Singapore is apparently different. 
Singapore scores low on political risk because the Singaporean 
government, under the PAP, sees domestic political opposition as a 
potential site of instability and has actively taken steps to curtail and 
contain critics. Paradoxically, Singapore's good rating on the 'political 
risk' scale might have jeopardized Singapore's democracy. However, 
what is good for international and domestic business is not necessarily 
good for civil society. 
The Singaporean PAP government has entrenched its dominant 
political position over a period of some four decades. Efforts continue 
to be taken to ensure that political activism remains low and managed 
through controlled channels (George 2000; Koh and Ooi 2000; Mauzy 
and Milne 2002). Alternative political expressions are often treated 
as dangerous and are met with efforts to neutralize them to maintain 
the country's 'stability'. Many PAP critics tread warily when making 
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any statements against the PAP because many have suffered the con-
sequences as 'dissidents' (see Gomez in this volume). 
As a self-acknowledged soft authoritarian regime, Singapore has 
become one of the most politically stable and economically competi-
tive countries in the world. The Singaporean model suggests that some 
elements of democracy must be controlled to maintain the country's 
stability. So, what are some of these political 'risks' that the ruling PAP 
is so keen to control? What are the examples of control and how have 
the strategies evolved over the years? What insights can we gain from 
examining how the PAP government has responded to domestic crit-
ics? Is the inability to effectively challenge PAP policies necessarily a 
good thing? These concerns are addressed in this special issue of The 
Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies.
The Papers in this Collection
After the rigour of the double-blind peer review process, ﬁve papers 
have been assembled for this collection. They all deal with the manage-
ment of (in)stabilities in Singapore. The collection begins with Marc 
Rerceretnam's 'Beyond the Clutches: The 1987 ISA Arrests and Interna-
tional Civil Society Responses to Political Repression in Singapore'. This 
provides an overview of how the 1987 crackdown on alleged dissidents 
in Singapore spurred international NGOs and expatriate Singaporean 
communities to focus attention on human rights abuses in Singapore 
and mobilize international opinion. We can see that the ISA was an 
effective tool for dealing with critics, but the PAP government had to 
pay the price of negative publicity from the international community 
and media.
In his article, 'Selling Security: The War on Terror and the Internal 
Security Act of Singapore', Damien Cheong demonstrates how the 
Singapore government, despite its respect for the rule of law, has been 
able to justify the use of the long-standing ISA on terrorist suspects. 
We see here that a new security environment has helped legitimize old 
laws in dealing with dissenters. We also see the creeping application 
of sophisticated public relations strategies to manage negative percep-
tions internationally.
Jonathan Woodier's article, 'Securing Singapore/Managing Percep-
tions: From Shooting the Messenger to Dodging the Question”, shows 
how the Singaporean government uses public relations in its various 
social and economic programmes. Singapore is of course not the only 
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country that attempts to manage and cultivate public opinions and per-
ceptions. This city-state, however, is in the forefront of this public rela-
tions engineering in Asia. The public relations campaigns are complex 
and driven by the need, ﬁrst, to persuade and coerce Singaporeans and 
the rest of the world to regard Singapore as a good place for investment, 
tourism and residence and, second, to simultaneously project Singapore 
as a socially and economically vulnerable city-state.
The fourth paper in this collection, by Yan Jin, Augustine Pang and 
Glen T. Cameron, analyses public perceptions of how the government 
managed the SARS crisis in 2003. Based on their survey, the paper 
concludes that the PAP government has been supremely successful in 
managing the perceptions and emotions of Singapore's residents by 
building on their ingrained fears of future insecurity.  
James Gomez, the author of the ﬁnal paper in this collection, evaluates 
the impact of laws that restrict and control the free speech of opposition 
parties and politicians in Singapore. He demonstrates how the freedom 
of speech of opposition parties is often restricted because of its potential 
to cause 'instability'. The struggle for freedom of expression in Singa-
pore needs to recruit new mechanisms to assist opposition politicians. 
A greater diversity of means also makes it harder for the PAP to keep 
control of all the news. 
The collection of papers presented in this special issue emerged out 
of the Singapore Studies Project initiated in 2004 at the Monash Asia 
Institute (Melbourne, Australia). 
James Gomez is a Ph.D. candidate at Monash Asia Institute, Monash 
University, Australia. Can-Seng Ooi is an Associate Professor at Copenhagen 
Business School. 
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